South AfricaJavelin from South Africa. Collected by Major Aylmer H. T. H. Somerset between 1879 and 1880. Given to the Museum by his nephew William H. B. Somerset in 1935.

This unusual arrow-headed spear would probably have been used as a javelin. It is one of a number of weapons - including spears, clubs and swords - collected by Major Aylmer H.T.H. Somerset (1835-1882) of the Rifle Brigade from the Third Anglo-Asante War in Ghana in 1873-4 and during the Ango-Zulu War of 1879. It is likely that Major Somerset retrieved this spear with several other items from the field during or after the Battle of Isandhlwana in 1879.

A Place in History

After the British took control of the former Dutch territory of Cape Colony in 1806 during the Napoleonic Wars, the British colonization of Southern Africa continued apace. By 1871, Britain had also assumed control over Natal, Griqualand and Basutoland (now Lesotho). The Dutch settlers moved inland away from British control to found the new states of Transvaal and Orange Free State, governed by the Boers.

By this time, the areas' indigenous peoples had been largely amalgamated into a united and powerful Zulu nation under the leadership of Shaka (c. 1787-1828). Inevitably, the tensions and power struggles between the British and the Boers often involved attempts to secure the loyalty of the Zulu. This, combined with the British preferment for diplomatic relationships with the 'natives', served to maintain an uneasy balance of power in the region. However, in 1874, Lord Carnarvon, who had successfully brought about federation in Canada, thought that a similar scheme might work in South Africa. He sent Sir Bartle Frere to South Africa as High Commissioner to bring it about by overcoming the major obstacles of the independent states of the South African Republic (Transvaal and Orange Free State) and, notably, the Kingdom of Zululand.

In 1873, the Cetshwayo (Cetewayo) became King of the Zulus. A stubborn, ambitious and ultimately tyrannical leader, Cetshwayo sought to recreate the potent Zulu military regime instigated by Shaka. He banished European missionaries from his lands and took an uncompromising view towards diplomatic policies and any impingements on the Zulus' traditional way of life. Cetshwayo had for some time been involved in border disputes with the Boers of the Transvaal, in which the British had initially supported him. However, when the British annexed the Transvaal in 1877 as part of Carnarvon's scheme, the dispute became theirs. Frere, anxious to subjugate the Zulu 'threat' ordered a Boundary Commisssion that, unsurprisingly, found the Zulus to be in contention. He also used several reported incidents of Zulu cruelty and summary justice against their own people and against Boers, to devise an 'ultimatum'.

This ultimatum included demands that were entirely removed from the border question, including the surrender of the Swazi chief, Umbilini, the disbandment of the Zulu army and the right for all warriors to marry without the King's permission, the reinstatement of missionaries into Zululand, and the establishment of a British Agent there to oversee the fulfillment of all 'agreements' and approve the legality of all legal proceedings and sentences. It is clear that Frere was looking for an excuse to invade Zululand; by giving Cetshwayo only a month to answer his unanswerable ultimatum, he took advantage of the lengthy communication time between South Africa and London, thus claiming the need to act before receiving authority to do so from his political superiors (who, incidentally, thoroughly disapproved of any kind of ultimatum).

Cetshwayo returned no answer, and in January 1879 a British force under Lieutenant General Frederick Augustus Thesiger, 2nd Baron Chelmsford invaded Zululand, without authorisation by the British Government. Lord Chelmsford had under him a force of 5000 Europeans and 8200 Africans (including Boers) deployed at the three points of Lower Tugela, Rorke's Drift and Utrecht, their objective to march on Ulundi, the capital of Zululand. Cetshwayo's army was much larger at about 40,000 men. On 22 January, the British central column camped at the foot of the mountain of Isandhlwana in what is now the kwaNatal-Zulu Province. Chelmsford joined a reconnaissance party that set out to investigate reports of Zulu movements to the south-east. He did not reckon there to be more than 500 or so Zulus in the are and certainly did not anticipate an attack so he neglected to leave orders for the camp's defence. In fact, over 20,000 Zulus were waiting patiently in the north-west and after they saw half the British troops set off in the wrong direction in pursuit of the diversion they had created, they swept round the mountain and pounced on the camp at around 8am. The element of surprise and sheer weight of numbers proved more of an advantage than guns as the Zulus annihilated the camp using spears and clubs in a short space of time. Six whole companies of the British 24th Foot Regiment (South Wales Borderers) were wiped out to a man. Eleven miles away, Chelmsford had received reports of the attack as it occurred but insisted they must be false as he could not see anything amiss from that distance. When he retuned in the evening however, a grisly sight awaited him: 1357 of the 1768 defenders had been killed and many of the remainder horribly wounded. The Zulu had also suffered heavy losses, up to 3000 men, although this represented a much smaller percentage of their total force.

The battle later moved to Rorke's Drift where the British reasserted themselves and defeated the Zulus. The Anglo-Zulu War continued for another six months, with the British eventually emerging victorious. However none of the battles matched Isandhlwana in terms of scale of loss and importance. Until the First World War, it remained the greatest single defeat ever suffered by the British Army. It caused much embarrassment and criticism at home and the authorities were quick to shroud the episode in stories of great heroism in the face of a huge and 'savage' enemy, citing it as 'An Epic of British Valour'. To illustrate the point of this 'savagery', much was made of the apparent disrespectful mutilation of British bodies on the battlefield. In reality, it was custom for the Zulus to open the chest cavity of the deceased in order to let the spirit escape and prevent the body swelling up. Meanwhile, attention was diverted to the desperate but successful subsequent defence of Rorke's Drift and the Queen's bestowal of eleven Victoria Crosses on its participants. This was the most ever awarded for a single engagement and highly disproportionate to the number of troops involved.

There have been many reasons given for the British defeat at Isandhlwana, such as unreliable maps, difficult terrain, the inability of the men to get their ammunition out the boxes quickly enough, jamming of the Martini-Henry rifles and the fact that the British had to try to defend an impossibly wide line. A formal enquiry blamed Durnford, an officer present at the battle, combined with the poor performance of the Natal native contingent. However, in truth, the fault lay with Chelmsford. A typical product of the privileged, conservative military establishment, with its emphasis on gentlemanly values, he lacked the military flair and vision necessary to overcome the deficiencies of a prosaic and cranking army system that was entering a new era of large-scale, mechanical warfare. He preferred stereotyped military tactics to the innovative ideas of some of his generals and deplored recent army reforms. He rarely engaged in discussions with his staff and demonstrated a lack of confidence in them by his inability to delegate or accept advice. Finally, and perhaps most crucially, he vastly underrated the fighting ability of the Zulu and paid the heaviest price.